Parker J reviewed the law on committal for contempt of court and sentencing for the same.
Parties
- H was in breach of multiple orders, initially to provide security for certain payments in the form of share certificates, and later to attend court personally and provide certain items of evidence.
- H had breached the undertaking to provide security by initially handing the certificates over to W’s solicitors, and then having them cancelled.
- It was held that this was a breach of the undertaking not only as it breached its purpose, but also because the cancellation of the certificates meant that all that was deposited with the firm were pieces of paper, and not the promised security.
- H then complained that W’s application for his committal was insufficiently particularised. Although details of the alleged appeared in an attached draft order and statement, they were not included on the face of the application.
Held
- Parker J confirmed that Harmsworth is still good law in relation to the requirement to particularise, however, the level of particularisation needed depends on the complexity of the breach alleged.
- Even where there is insufficient particularisation, the documents supporting an application (such as a draft order) can waive a defect in the application.
- The criterion for determining such a waiver is now based on the interests of justice and whether the alleged contemnor would suffer an injustice or prejudice. There is no longer a threshold of exceptionality.
- In W v H (No 3), Parker J drew together a list of 11 sentencing principles at [13], noting in particular that there is no presumption of suspension of a term of imprisonment on the first breach.
